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Which features of the humanmind, now genetically inherited, were once the products of learning?
This question relates to theBaldwin effect (see Glossary) – a process in which an initially learned
response to environmental change acquires a genetic basis [1–4]. This process is also known,
sometimes in a misleading way [5], as organic selection [1], genetic assimilation [6], and expe-
riential canalization [7]. Whatever it is called, Baldwin’s hypothesis postulates that, at the popula-
tion level, learned characteristics can 'sink in'; they can become part of what offspring
inherit organically from their parents.
In the following we bring empirical research from cognitive science to bear on the hypothesis that
some aspects of human cognition have sunk in – that they were initially learned and are now
genetically inherited. We argue that there is good empirical evidence for this hypothesis regarding
peripheral cognitive mechanisms (i.e., input or perceptual systems, and output or action systems,
bothmodulated by attention andmotivation), but not for the complex and interlocking central pro-
cesses, involving inference and memory, that have durable effects on the relationships between
perception and action [8] (Figure 1, Key Figure).
After introducing the Baldwin effect, we next focus on preparedness [9,10]. For 50 years, experi-
mental psychologists have investigated the preparedness of mechanisms involved in learning
taste aversions and fears, and how these mechanisms have been specialised by evolution to do
their jobs well. We argue that this research not only provides much-needed empirical evidence of
Baldwinisation but also illuminates the targets of selection. Specifically, research on preparedness
suggests that, across species, Baldwinisation has had a much greater impact on peripheral than
on central cognitive mechanisms [11]. There has been genetic assimilation of learning-induced
changes in perception, attention, motivation, and motor control – processes that modulate inputs
to, and outputs from, the core inference processes of the brain – but little if any change to the struc-
ture of central processors themselves. We then extend the analysis to language and imitation,
human faculties that are widely thought to have been genetically assimilated. The evidence here884 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.08.006
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Glossary
Active intermodal matching (AIM): a
hypothetical mechanism for converting
observed actions into a topographically
similar motor output via unspecified
computations.
Adaptive landscape: a space
representing potential genotypes, the
degree of similarity between them, and
their related fitness values.
Adaptive specialisation: a trait that is
effective in dealing with a problem
encountered in the natural environment
of a species (e.g., the risk of ingesting
toxins).
Aplastic evolution: genetic evolution
that does not depend on the Baldwin
effect.
Associative learning: learning based
on the establishment of excitatory and
inhibitory links between simple,
sensorimotor representations of events.
Often studied using Pavlovian (classical)
and instrumental (operant) conditioning
procedures.
Associative sequence learning
(ASL): amodel suggesting that imitation
is mediated by learned associations
between visual and motor
representations of actions (matching
vertical associations) and domain-
general sequence-learning mechanisms
(horizontal processes).
Baldwin effect: a process in which an
initially learned response to
environmental change acquires a
genetic basis.
Blackboxing: failure to consider
underlying mechanisms; in the present
context, failure to enquire about
neurocognitive mechanisms when
investigating behaviour.
Construction grammar: an approach
to linguistics which proposes that
language is built, bottom-up, from layers
of local form-meaning mappings,
termed constructions, that can be
learned independently.
Evolutionary psychology: a research
programme, founded in the 1990s, that
seeks to explain psychological
characteristics as the products of gene-
based natural selection.
Experimental evolution: the use of
selective breeding in laboratory and field
experiments to investigate how
populations adapt to new environments
through natural selection.
Fear-relevant stimuli: objects and
events that were a danger to the
evolutionary ancestors of contemporary
humans (e.g., snakes and spiders).
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesalso suggests that Baldwinisation has targeted peripheral mechanisms – the psychological
analogues of keyboards, scanners, speakers, and printers and their associated software – and
not the core cognitive processes that make language and imitation possible.
The Baldwin Effect
Imagine a population of squirrels driven by invaders into terrain where the only edible food is a new
type of nut. Although the new nuts are highly nutritious, their shells can be cracked by these
squirrels only via a complex, repetitive sequence of biting and hammering. Through luck and des-
peration some of the squirrels learn this sequence by trial and error. Initially their new nut-cracking
behaviour is an ontogenetic adaptation. However, if the learning is not too costly, and con-
sumption of the new nuts enhances fitness, there may be enough time for selection to favour
any genetic changes that make the learning faster or easier – mutations that enable the nut-
cracking behaviour to develop with less environmental input. In that case, and in a range
of more complex scenarios, the behaviour would become, at least in part, a phylogenetic
adaptation – it would be Baldwinised.
The Baldwin hypothesis has been invoked to explain a wide range of behavioural traits across the
animal kingdom [12–15], including prey capture in archer fish [16] and the song of zebra finches
[17,18]. In the case of humans, Baldwinisation is thought to have played a key role in the emer-
gence of language [19–24] and imitation [25–28].
A major appeal of the Baldwin hypothesis is that it promises to explain how natural selection finds a
‘good trick’ or needle in a haystack [29] – a highly adaptive phenotype that is too complex to be the
product of a single mutation, and too isolated within an adaptive landscape to be discovered by
an incremental series of mutations (Figure 1) [30]. According to 'Baldwin boosters' [31], learning is
much more likely than aplastic evolution [17] to find isolated spikes in an adaptive landscape
because each learner explores throughout its lifetime. The population can search the space of
potential solutions more efficiently through learning than through genetic variation. Furthermore,
once learning has found a solution, it can help to sustain the adaptive phenotype long enough
for it to become progressively fixed, Baldwinised or genetically assimilated, because mutations
that reduce the need for environmental input are favoured by natural selection.
Historically, the Baldwin effect was seen by its critics as a Lamarckian threat to the standard,
modern synthesis view of evolution [32]. It is now clear that Baldwinisation can occur without
violation of Weismann’s doctrine [33], and the principal problem is empirical. Ironically, the
Baldwin 'effect' is a hypothesis with few well-validated empirical examples. Verbal reasoning and
computational modelling indicate that Baldwinisation offers an elegant and plausible explanation
for many morphological and behavioural adaptations [12–15,19,20,23,24], but in the behavioural
case there is very little concrete, empirical evidence of its occurrence [3]. The evolutionary history
of most naturally occurring adaptations, ancestral and intermediate forms, cannot be recovered
from the mists of time, and artificial selection or experimental evolution (e.g., [34,35]) can be
studied only in animals such as Drosophila that have very rapid generational turnover.
The explanatory value of the Baldwin hypothesis is also limited by blackboxing – failure to
enquire about the neurocognitive mechanisms controlling overt behaviour [36,37]. Baldwin was
a psychologist, and in the 125 years since his seminal article [1] experimental psychology and
cognitive neuroscience have made significant advances in understanding the computational
mechanisms controlling behaviour in human and nonhuman animals. However, very little of this
information from cognitive science has penetrated research on Baldwinisation. Modelling
suggests that the probability of Baldwinisation depends crucially on 'details of developmentalTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11 885
Genetic assimilation: biologists who
do not equate the Baldwin effect with
genetic assimilation cast the latter as a
process in which environmental change
exposes pre-existing genetic variation to
selection, in other words a process that
is not dependent on learning.
Horizontal processes: domain-
general psychological mechanisms that
encode sequences of body movements
and of other inanimate stimuli.
Matching vertical association: a
bidirectional excitatory link between a
visual representation and a motor
representation of the same action.
Modern synthesis: a reconciliation in
the early 20th century of Darwin’s theory
of evolution and Mendel’s observations
on heredity.
Non-matching vertical association:
a bidirectional excitatory link between a
visual representation of one action and a
motor representation of a different
action.
Ontogenetic adaptation: a trait
promoting survival and reproduction
which is acquired through interaction
between an individual and its
environment in the course of
development.
Phylogenetic adaptation: a trait
promoting survival and reproduction
which has been shaped by natural
selection acting on genetic variants.
Preparedness: a state of a learning
process that is thought to indicate that it
has been specialised by natural selection
to fulfil a particular function.
Universal grammar (UG): a
hypothetical innate set of abstract
grammatical principles that are held to
underlie the world’s natural languages.
Weismann’s doctrine: contrary to
what is claimed by supporters of
Lamarckian inheritance, Weismann’s
doctrine states that hereditary
information does not flow from the soma
to the germline.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesprocesses, such as the psychological mechanisms of learning' [17], but most applications of the
Baldwin hypotheses continue to assert that behaviour X has been genetically assimilated without
asking what type of learning drove the assimilation of X, or about the neurocognitive processes
that were targets of selection.
In short, the Baldwin effect is a promising hypothesis rather than an empirical effect, and, although
Baldwin was a psychologist, cognitive science is conspicuously absent from research done in his
name. In the next section we address these problems by highlighting experimental evidence that
taste-aversion learning has been Baldwinised, and by surveying recent research in cognitive
science suggesting that, in both taste-aversion and fear learning, it is changes to peripheral
processes that have sunk in.
Preparedness
In 1966, Garcia and colleagues published experiments suggesting that rats learn some contingen-
cies more readily than others. Relationships between flavours and illness, and between audiovisual
stimuli and electric shock, appeared to be learned more readily than relationships between flavours
and shock, or audiovisual stimuli and illness [38,39]. Garcia’s results were soon dubbed as
evidence of 'preparedness' [9], and several psychologists were inspired by them to advance a
new adaptive specialisation conception of learning [40–42]. Laying the groundwork for human
evolutionary psychology [43], this new concept challenged the view that all or most learning is
mediated by a common set of associative learning processes, discovered through condi-
tioning experiments [44]. It suggested instead that animals, including humans, not only have a
diverse range of input and output devices but also have many different central mechanisms of
learning, each tailored by natural selection to meet specific adaptive challenges. However, a close
analysis of the literature on taste aversion and fear reveals that these suggestions were mistaken.
Taste Aversion
Evidence that taste-aversion learning has been Baldwinised comes from elegant studies of experi-
mental evolution in Drosophila melanogaster (see Figure I in Box 1) [34,35]. Female flies first experi-
enced relationships between stimuli (e.g., orange paired with a quinine-adulterated substrate for egg
laying; pineapple paired with a safe substrate). They were then allowed to lay eggs on either orange
or pineapple substrates without adulteration. Only when subsequent generations were raised exclu-
sively from eggs laid on the previously safe substratewas there an increase in rate of learning flavour–
quinine associations. By contrast, control lines of flies, which were treated similarly but without expo-
sure to quinine, did not show changes in learning over generations. After 45 generations, flies from
experimentally selected lines associated quinine more rapidly both with orange and pineapple and
with the novel flavours, tomato and apple. This is a Baldwin effect: the researchers produced envi-
ronmental change by adding quinine to substrates; the flies initially responded to this change by
learning to avoid flavours encountered with quinine, and over generations of selection this learned
response evolved a genetic basis.
However, the Drosophila studies do not tell us which part of the learning process acquired a
genetic basis: what exactly sunk in. After selection, did the flies learn faster because they were
using new computational machinery specifically to encode flavour–quinine relationships (a change
in central mechanisms), or were they merely better able to perceive quinine, or to attend to
differences between specific types of cue (changes in peripheral mechanisms)? The Drosophila
experiments did not answer these questions because the flies were exposed to only one type of
outcome (quinine) and typically to cues in only one modality (flavour), but studies of taste-aversion
learning in rats, using two cue modalities and two outcomes, suggest that the genetic changes
altered peripheral rather than central cognitive processes (Box 1).886 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11
Key Figure
The Peripheral Baldwinisation of Cognition
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Figure 1. (Top left) Generating behaviour involves input, central, and output processes that are analogous to ingestion, digestion, and expenditure of energy. Peripheral
processes include the perceptual systems that provide input, the action systems that provide output, and the attentional and motivational processes that modulate both
perception and action. Central processes, involving memory and inference, have durable effects on the relationships between inputs and outputs. (Top right) Via the
Baldwin effect, learning dramatically reduces the search problem in high dimensional genetic 'fitness landscapes'. Aplastic evolution requires a population to stumble
upon good solutions, corresponding to 'spikes' in the landscape (red curve), by chance, for example via mutation. Learning can turn a spike into a gentle hill (green
curve); individuals with a wide range of genetic resources, from a variety of genetic starting points, can find progressively better solutions through individual or social
learning. The evidence reviewed in this article suggests that peripheral processes (perception, motor, attention, and motivation icons) have evolved via the Baldwin
effect. (Bottom) The peripheral Baldwinisation hypothesis is supported by research on experimental evolution in Drosophila, studies of taste-aversion and fear learning
in rats, and by research on language and imitation in humans.
Trends in Cognitive SciencesGarcia and Koelling [38] exposed rats to a compound of a flavour plus audiovisual stimuli before
either illness or footshock and reported that the flavour was avoided after illness whereas the
audiovisual stimulus was avoided after shock. This result has not withstood the test of time.
Subsequent studies have shown that rats avoid flavours paired with shock when the flavour-
to-shock interval is lengthened (e.g., [45]), and have no difficulty in learning relationships between
non-flavour cues and illness (e.g., [46,47]) (Box 1).
More broadly, recent research suggests that rats learn aversions to flavour and non-flavour stimuli
via the same computations, but knowledge that a stimulus is predictive of nausea, and
knowledge that it is predictive of pain, is expressed in different behaviours. Pairing palatable
flavours with injection of either lithium chloride (LiCl, that induces nausea) or hypertonic salineTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11 887
Trends in Cognitive Sciences(that induces pain) suppresses consumption of flavours at equivalent speeds (e.g., [48]). How-
ever, in addition to reduced consumption when the flavours are subsequently presented alone,
LiCl-induced nausea results in orofacial reactions indicative of disgust, whereas hypertonic
saline-based pain results in freezing indicative of fear. Crucially, these outcome-specific
responses are also displayedwith non-flavour cues that were previously paired with LiCl or hyper-
tonic saline [49]. Therefore, there is indeed something special about aversion learning. However,
the 'specialness' relates, not to connections between tastes and illness, but to the behaviours
triggered by knowledge that a stimulus, any stimulus, predicts illness. The motor processes,
mechanisms producing a behavioural printout, have been specialised.
Fear Learning
The concept of preparedness was inspired by Garcia’s taste-aversion work, but was first applied
by Seligman [9,10] to human learning of fears and phobias. Seligman’s account suggested that
specialised, central mechanisms of fear learning more readily connect aversive events, such as
electric shock, with fear-relevant stimuli, such as snakes – which presented genuine threats
to our evolutionary ancestors – than with 'fear-irrelevant' stimuli such as geometric shapes or
flowers. This account predicts that fear of fear-relevant objects should be learned faster, and
be extinguished more slowly when shock no longer occurs, as well as being resistant to top-
down modification, for example, by instructions indicating that shocks will not occur.Box 1. Taste-Aversion Learning
Research on rodent taste-aversion learning complements research on the experimental evolution of taste aversion in
Drosophila. Studies on Drosophila provide direct evidence of Baldwinisation, but do not tell us whether central or periph-
eral processes have sunk in. In a complementary way, rodent studies do not provide direct evidence of Baldwinisation, but
indicate that when taste-aversion learning is specialised, via Baldwinian or aplastic evolution, it is peripheral processes that
change. Further studies supporting these conclusions are outlined in the following text, together with suggestions about
how the two lines of research could be more fully integrated.
Using a procedure similar to that shown in Figure I, a further study of experimental evolution in Drosophila [35] presented
colour–flavour compound stimuli and made either the colour or the flavour a reliable predictor of quinine across genera-
tions and the basis for egg selection. For example, in a 'colour-reliable, flavour-unreliable' condition, where blue-banana
stimuli had been lacedwith quinine, eggs were allowed to hatch only if they had not been laid on the blue substrate, regard-
less of the blue substrate’s flavour. After 40 generations, colour-reliable/flavour-unreliable lines learned about colour but
not flavour cues, whereas colour-unreliable/flavour-reliable lines learned about flavour but not colour cues. This could
mean that, through Baldwinisation, successive generations of flies had become better able to associate one type of cue
(colour or flavour) with aversive outcomes (a central effect). However, it could instead indicate Baldwinisation of enhanced
attention to colour in the colour-reliable lines, and to flavour in the flavour-reliable lines (a peripheral effect).
Turning to rodents, further evidence against the original interpretation of Garcia’s results [38,39,119], that posited specialisa-
tion of central processes, has come from experiments that do not rely on fluid consumption as the only index of aversion.
When suppression of motion, akin to freezing, and avoidance of stimulus location are also used to measure aversion, there
is clear evidence of learning when non-flavour cues are paired with lithium-induced nausea (e.g., [46,120]).
These rat studies do not prove a negative; they do not show definitively that central processes have not been specialised.
Instead, they show that claims for specialisation of central processes have been based on evidence that is no longer
compelling. By contrast, recent work (main text) has provided positive evidence for specialisation of peripheral processes:
for both flavour and non-flavour stimuli, illness, and pain elicit very different motor outputs [48,49].
How could these two lines of research, with Drosophila and rats, be integrated to provide stronger evidence of the
Baldwinisation of central and/or peripheral processes for taste-aversion learning? The rat work suggests that, to find
out whether selective breeding leads to Baldwinisation of central or peripheral processes in Drosophila, one needs to vary
cue type and outcome type within single experiments. For example, one could expose flies to an environment where
colour, but not flavour, reliably predicts quinine adulteration at the same time as flavour, but not colour, reliably predicts
temperature variation [121]. Only genetic change to central learning mechanisms could explain increased learning across
generations about colour when quinine was the outcome and, simultaneously, increased learning about flavour when
temperature was the outcome. By contrast, peripheral specialisation would be expected to produce improved learning
across generations with both colour and flavour, regardless of which outcome was presented.
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Figure I. Procedure for Studying Experimental Evolution of Learning in Drosophila melanogaster. Adapted,
with permission, from [34].
Trends in Cognitive SciencesThe results of early experiments were consistent with some of these predictions (e.g., [50,51]),
but none has withstood extended experimental investigation. Faster or better conditioning with
fear-relevant stimuli has rarely been observed, and there is ample evidence that, like most
associative learning (e.g., [52]), it can be modified by instruction (reviewed in [53,54]). Initially
it seemed that responses to fear-relevant stimuli might extinguish more slowly. However, a
recent systematic review [55] found that most positive findings came from a single laboratory,
and a large majority of the full set of studies had failed to find differences between fear-relevant
and fear-irrelevant stimuli in the rate of extinction.
These results suggest that fear of snakes and other fear-relevant stimuli is learned via the same
central mechanisms as fear of arbitrary stimuli. Nevertheless, if that is correct, why do phobias
so often relate to objects encountered by our ancestors, such as snakes and spiders, rather
than to objects such as guns and electrical sockets that are dangerous now [10]? Because periph-
eral, attentional mechanisms are tuned to fear-relevant stimuli, all threat stimuli attract attention, but
fear-relevant stimuli do so without learning (e.g., [56]). This answer is supported by evidence from
conditioning experiments demonstrating enhanced attention to fear-relevant stimuli regardless of
learning (Box 2), studies of visual search [57–59], and developmental psychology [60,61]. For ex-
ample, infants aged 6–9 months show a greater drop in heart rate – indicative of heightened atten-
tion rather than fear – when they watch snakes than when they watch elephants [62].
In sum: early research on taste-aversion and fear learning launched the idea that animal minds are
populated by adaptively specialised central learning mechanisms – that were later cast by evolu-
tionary psychologists as 'modules'. Over the past 50 years careful experimental work withTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11 889
Box 2. Fear-Relevant Stimuli Grab Attention
Early signs that fear-relevant stimuli, such as snakes (Figure I), are special in the extent to which they grab attention came
from human conditioning studies in the 1970s. These showed that, unlike other shapes (excluding faces), which capture
attention according to their previously experienced value [122,123], the pulling power of fear-relevant stimuli is experience-
independent. Fear-relevant stimuli elicit orienting responses even before they had been paired with electric shock [124],
and, after pairing, orienting begins as soon as the fear-relevant stimulus is presented, instead of when the shock is due
to occur (e.g., [125,126]).
A classic experiment demonstrated how enhanced attention to fear-relevant cues can give the false impression that these
cues are linked to aversive outcomes via a specialised learning mechanism [127]. Lovibond and colleagues compared
responses between two pairs of cues that had previously been learned about individually. One pair comprised a fear-rel-
evant and a fear-irrelevant cue (e.g., a snake and amushroom), the other comprised two fear-irrelevant cues (e.g., a moun-
tain and a flower). In each pair, one cue had been previously linked with shock, and the other had not. Crucially, for half the
participants, the fear-relevant cue had been linked with shock, and for the remainder the fear-irrelevant cue had been
linked with shock. If fear-relevance produced better learning (i.e., a centrally mediated process), then the response to
the test compound of a fear-relevant and a fear-irrelevant cue should be higher than to the test compound of two fear-ir-
relevant cues only if the fear-relevant cue had been linked with shock. However, if fear-relevant cues are special only in their
capacity to capture attention, then the overall response to the compound of a fear-relevant and a fear-irrelevant cue should
be higher than to the compound of two fear-irrelevant cues, regardless of whether the fear-relevant cue or the fear-irrele-
vant cue had been linked with shock. This latter result was observed.
Studies such as this one by Lovibond and colleagues, that tease apart the contributions of attention and learning, use complex
experimental designs and are often reported in language that it is difficult for non-specialists to understand (the same is true of
experiments on conditioned taste aversion; Box 1). Perhaps that is why many researchers continue to assume that fear-rele-
vant stimuli are processedby specialised central learningmechanismswhen the data indicate instead that, owing to specialised
peripheral processes, potentially dangerous animals are very good at grabbing our attention [128,129].
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Figure I. A Western Green Mamba Snake.
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesrodents, using the original methods, has confirmed the occurrence of adaptive specialisation, and
more recent studies on Drosophila have shown that it is likely to have occurred via a Baldwinian
process. However, the rodent work has also shown that the changes are in peripheral rather than
in central cognitive mechanisms.890 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11
Trends in Cognitive SciencesDistinctively Human Faculties
Taste-aversion and fear learning occur in a wide range of species and are rarely considered from a
Baldwinian perspective.We now turn to two capacities – language and imitation – that are distinc-
tively human, and which are commonly claimed to have evolved through genetic assimilation.
Language
Human linguistic behaviour is often viewed as comprising an abstract, modality-independent set
of grammatical rules and principles (language), and a complex set of perceptuomotor skills
(speech/sign [63]). A Baldwinian account is highly implausible for the former, but highly plausible
for the latter.
Universal grammar (UG) is a hypothetical innate set of abstract grammatical principles
supposed to underlie the world’s natural languages [64], variously termed a 'language module'
[8], 'organ' [64], or 'instinct' [65]. If some type of UG is part of human biology, how could it
evolve? Pinker and Bloom ([24], see also [66]) look to the Baldwin effect: suppose that
there are grammatical properties of language that are initially acquired through learning.
Such learning will be influenced by genetic bias, and learners with the 'right' bias will be
selected. Over many generations, the best learners will be those for whom UG is simply
'built in' to the genes. Learning a specific language then merely involves filling in language-
specific details [67], the relevant grammatical parameters, words, idioms, and sounds specific
to, for example, English, Hopi, Mandarin, or Xhosa.
The UG picture has, however, collided with several problematic observations: first, close examina-
tion of the world’s languages suggests that they have few universal features [68]. There are
undoubtedly common characteristics that arise from the challenge of robust sequential communi-
cation with limited processing resources (e.g., a distinctive level of phonological representation), as
well as from the nature of the natural and social worlds (e.g., the ability to refer to people, objects,
and actions; to make statements, ask questions, give commands, etc.) [69], but these are imple-
mented in a dazzling variety of ways – diverse phonologies, syntactic and semantic categories,
and so on [68,70]. Furthermore, evidence that FOXP2 is not a 'language gene' [71], that
'specific language impairment' is not specific to language [72], and that Broca’s area is not a
'language centre' in the brain – that language processing recruits large areas of the cortex
(e.g., [73]) – has undermined the view that there is a dedicated language acquisition device.
Many in contemporary linguistics now see language as being built from a construction grammar,
and regard each language as being assembled, bottom-up, from accumulations of idiosyncratic
linguistic patterns that are not built on an underlying Bauplan [74,75], and that is learned piecemeal
rather than following universal rules [76].
Even if the UG view was consistent with contemporary evidence from comparative linguistics and
cognitive science, the Baldwinian account of UG would be implausible. It predicts that genetically
different populations of modern humans should be adapted to their specific linguistic history [77].
For example, speakers of Walpiri, an aboriginal language of Australia, who were genetically
separated from speakers of Indo-European languages for at least 40 000 years, should – but
do not – have difficulty learning English because they are genetically biased towards the distinc-
tive speech sounds and grammar of Australian aboriginal languages.
A second problem is that linguistic change is far faster than genetic change: hence language pro-
vides a 'moving target' that genes cannot successfully follow (Box 3). Computer simulations of
gene–language coevolution have indicated that, although the Baldwin effect can operate if the
language is artificially held constant, once language change is allowed, the Baldwin effectTrends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11 891
Box 3. Moving Targets: Can Grammar Be Established by the Baldwin Effect?
A study of the ‘moving target’ problem [130] simulated the coevolution of grammatical features and the genes of popula-
tions of simple learners over 500 generations. The learners evolved by mutation and sexual reproduction to learn a set of
binary 'linguistic' features, and their fitness depended only on how quickly they learned these features. 'Genes' could be
biased to one or other feature value, or neutral alleles (which learn either feature value more slowly). When the grammatical
features do not change over time, the Baldwin effect occurs: neutral alleles are 'driven out' and the genome encodes the
'correct' binary features of the language such that learning is very rapid (dark line in Figure I). However, if language changes
at the same speed as genetic change (light line), or, more realistically, much faster (dotted line), the Baldwin effect vanishes:
neutral genes dominate because genes which are biased to 'yesterday’s language' are actually harmful. Language change
is typically very fast: the entire Indo-European language family, including languages as diverse as Hindi, Danish, Latin, and
Welsh, arose in the past 10 000 years [131].
It is tempting to counter that these problems are beside the point; because it is the universal aspects of language that
we wish to explain. These, being universal, do not vary when human populations disperse, and are not 'moving
targets'; instead, they are putatively completely stable and are hence shared by English, Walpiri, and all other natural
languages, thus blocking the possibility of divergent gene–language coevolution [78]. Nevertheless, the Baldwin ef-
fect was intended to explain how universal features of language arise; and therefore, on pain of circularity, cannot
presuppose universality before Baldwinisation.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Figure I. The ‘Moving Target’ Problem. Adapted, with permission, from [130].
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesdisappears. Indeed, genetic learning biases become disadvantageous because they are typically
biased towards yesterday’s language, not today’s [78].
A third problem for the Baldwinisation of UG viewpoint is that cultural evolution will often favour at
best weak, rather than strong, constraints on learning [79–81]. Learners with weak learning
biases will, through cultural evolution, create languages that match these biases. However,
there is then no selective advantage of having stronger, rigid genetic constraints – and any
constraints would be expected to decay in the absence of selection pressure.
By contrast, speech/sign is a good target for Baldwinisation because it presents the same
challenges across languages and over long stretches of time (although we focus on the
perceptuomotor demands of spoken languages in this article, some scholars have argued that
signed rather than spoken languages may be older [82], and hence have also been subject to892 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11
Trends in Cognitive SciencesBaldwinisation). Speech production involves intricate and rapid manipulation of the tongue, lips,
and larynx, combined with breathing control, which is not observed in other primates [83].
Specialised neurocomputational mechanisms controlling these movements [84] and for perceiving
rapid streams of subtly distinct sounds [85] are likely to have coevolved with the emergence
of speech through Baldwinian evolution [86]. Moreover, regarding speech perception, there is
intriguing evidence linking population frequencies of specific genes with speakers of languages
with lexical tone (i.e., word identities are partly defined by pitch contours) [87], aswell as experimen-
tal evidence that one such gene, ASPM, correlates with perception of lexical tone at the level of
individual speakers [88]. Although causal direction is, of course, difficult to infer from such correla-
tional data, these data fit with a two-way, Baldwinian, interaction of genes and speech perception.
Finally, it has been shown [89], by computer simulation, that the Baldwin effect can operate for
neural mechanisms for speech processing, in contrast to UG [78,90].
If special-purposemachinery for speech arises through the Baldwin effect, the same should apply
for complex vocal behaviours in other species. Indeed, lesion studies show that diverse bird
groups (parrots, hummingbirds, and songbirds) all have distinctive neural pathways specific for
vocal production/perception, with surprising similarities both to each other, and apparently to
speech-specific pathways in humans [91].
Thus, research in comparative linguistics and cognitive science suggest that Baldwinian selection
does not underlie a putative UG, but the Baldwin effect may have helped to establish specialised
perceptuomotor machinery that underlies speech.
Imitation
We are Homo imitans [92]. Humans can copy the topography of actions – how parts of the body
move relative to one another –more prolifically and with greater precision than any other species,
and these imitative skills enable our use of technology and the formation of cooperative social
groups.
At the cognitive level, the capacity to imitate was until recently thought to depend on a powerful,
genetically inherited black box; an active intermodal matching (AIM) mechanism for
converting observed actions (e.g., the sight of winking) into topographically similar motor output
(performance of winking) via unspecified computations [93]. In principle, such a black box could
have arisen via Baldwinisation or aplastic evolution [17]. However, AIM is no longer a viable modelBox 4. Imitation Is Not in Our Genes
Influential research in the 1970s suggested that newborn human babies can copy a range of facial and manual gestures, implying that a core capacity for imitation is
genetically inherited [132]. In 2016, this result was undermined by a large-scale study in Brisbane of more than 100 newborns [95]. The 100 babies were tested at 1,
3, 6, and 9 weeks after birth, for imitation of nine action types, using the gold-standard 'cross-target' method introduced in the 1970s. There was no evidence of
imitation for any of the nine action types; in other words, in no case did the infants perform the act more frequently after seeing the same action (red lines in Figure I)
than after seeing the alternative actions in the test set (black lines in Figure I). For example, the frequency of mouth opening was no greater after the infants had
observed mouth opening than after they had observed tongue protrusion, a sad face, grasping, or the other tested actions.
Previous failures to find neonatal imitation have been attributed to methodological factors, for example the use of an inappropriate model, an inadequate response in-
terval, or suboptimal statistical procedures. A recent meta-analysis of neonatal imitation research, encompassing 336 effect sizes dating back to 1977, sought and did
not find a modulating influence of 13 methodological factors that had been previously cited as reasons for replication failure [133]. However, the meta-analysis did find a
modulating effect of 'researcher affiliation'; a small number of laboratories were more likely than others to find large positive effects. Furthermore, across the whole
dataset there was a relationship between standard error and effect size that was indicative of publication bias, suggesting that smaller studies had been conducted,
but they found no evidence of neonatal imitation and had not been published.
In the light of the Brisbane study and subsequent meta-analysis, neonatal imitation can no longer been regarded as a reliable phenomenon. This is consistent with a
growing body of evidence that imitation develops slowly in the course of childhood [96] and depends on social experience in which infants and children are exposed
to synchronous action, optical mirrors, and imitation by other agents [100,134,135].
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Figure I. No Evidence of Imitation in Newborns in a Large-Scale Study. Adapted, with permission, from [95].
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesof imitation. This model’s evidence base has been undermined by studies indicating that new-
borns do not imitate [94–97], and it has become clear that AIM predicts imitative capacities in
infants that are not present even in adults [98,99] (Box 4).
The associative sequence learning (ASL)model of imitation [100–102] has providedmore fer-
tile ground for Baldwin hypotheses [25–28]. The ASL model suggests that imitation depends on
two sets of horizontal processes – that encode sequences of observed action components
and mediate motor learning, respectively – and on a large repertoire ofmatching vertical asso-
ciations, bidirectional excitatory links, each connecting a visual representation of an action com-
ponent with a motor representation of a similar component (e.g., the sight of winking with a motor
programme for winking). Two hypotheses suggest that Baldwinisation might have occurred for894 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11
Outstanding Questions
How widespread is the Baldwin
effect? For example, has it shaped
face processing, episodic memory,
social exchange reasoning, normative
thinking, mathematical cognition, and
mentalising?
Baldwinisation is plausible for human
fear learning, imitation, and language
because there is evidence that traits
which now have a genetic basis were
learned earlier in the organism’s
phylogenetic history. Is this a general
principle? How confidently can we infer
Baldwinisation, rather than aplastic
evolution, from evidence that a trait was
learned earlier in phylogenetic history?
Are there cases where the Baldwin effect
has operated on central cognitive
processes?
What sinks in when Drosophila are
artificially selected for aversion learning?
Would studies of experimental evolution
using two cue modalities and two types
of outcome confirm the evidence from
rats that peripheral processes are
Baldwinised?
Research using behavioural and
physiological measures suggests that
young infants are especially attentive to,
rather than fearful of, snakes. Can this
evidence of peripheral Baldwinisation be
confirmed using neurological measures
of attention? Are infants better able to
associate snakes with positive than with
negative outcomes?
Has the motivation to align our thought
and behaviour with others, for example
in joint action and communication,
been Baldwinised?
Many theorists argue that language
was originally gestural rather than vocal.
If so, are there traces of Baldwinisation
of gestural communication, over and
above manual dexterity required, for
example, in tool use?
Can we find evidence that sequence
processing and motivation have been
Baldwinised specifically for imitation?
For example, are there types of action,
or stages in the learning process,
where different computations encode
action and non-action sequences for
imitation and recognition? Is it easier to
train infants to copy body movements
Trends in Cognitive Scienceshorizontal [27] or vertical [28] processes, and two more propose Baldwinisation of attention to
body movements [25] or motivation to imitate [28].
The first hypothesis proposes Baldwinisation of horizontal processes that encode sequences of
observed actions. The central idea is that, while imitating simple actions using matching vertical
associations, possibly in a tool-using context, ancestral humans learned newways of segmenting
and reassembling stimulus sequences [27], and that these new horizontal processes subse-
quently acquired a genetic basis. This is an intriguing hypothesis with the virtue of testability. How-
ever, instead of supporting the hypothesis, current evidence suggests that the same
neurocognitive mechanisms encode sequences of observed body movements and of inanimate
stimuli, in both imitative [103] and non-imitative tasks [104,105].
The secondBaldwin hypothesis is also incompatible with current data. In principle, Baldwinian evo-
lution could have made it easier to learn matching than non-matching vertical associations
[28], for example it may be easier for agents to associate the sight of a hand opening with perfor-
mance of hand-opening than with performance of hand-closing. However, training experiments
have shown that non-matching vertical associations can be learned with remarkable speed
[106–108].
By contrast, there is empirical support for the idea that motivational [28] and attentional processes
[25,27] have been Baldwinised in ways that could facilitate imitation. Humans have higher social
motivation than chimpanzees – for example, we are more likely to choose social over asocial
activities [109] – and, although many species are more attentive to biological than non-
biological motion [110], from infancy humans are especially attentive to faces [111–113] and
hands [114], particularly hands in motion [115,116]. There is currently no evidence that
enhanced social motivation and attentiveness to body movements are adaptations for imitation
specifically. Social motivation supports care and cooperation in a wide range of human
contexts, and early attention to hands, especially one’s own hands in motion, facilitates the
development of all hand–eye coordination, for example reaching and grasping movements, not
merely the imitation of handmovements [25]. However, increases in social motivation and attention
to body movements are likely to have made our ancestors better imitators, and therefore non-
specific Baldwinisation of these peripheral mechanisms is a plausible hypothesis.
Another peripheral Baldwinisation hypothesis proposes that evolution has enhanced human moti-
vation to imitate specifically, that it has increased the 'intrinsic rewardingness of imitation' [28]. This
is a promising idea for future investigation, but current evidence that children overimitate – imitate
more than chimpanzees, and more than is necessary to obtain instrumental rewards [117,118] –
is equally compatible with this view and with the idea that general social motivation, rather than
imitation-specific motivation, makes humans enthusiastic copiers of body movements [101].
The Baldwinisation of imitation merits further investigation (see Outstanding Questions) but the
current picture – indicating nonspecific, peripheral Baldwinisation – makes evolutionary sense.
If matching vertical associations sunk in, or infants genetically inherited a specific motivation to
imitate, there is a risk that they would have difficulty learning the non-imitative, complementary
actions that are required in many economic and social contexts – to grasp when another agent
releases their grip, to push when another pulls.
Concluding Remarks
The Baldwin effect has seemed promising for a very long time. For more than a century it has
been poised to revolutionise our understanding of the evolution of complex behavioural traits,Trends in Cognitive Sciences, November 2020, Vol. 24, No. 11 895
(‘overimitation’) than to copy object
movements?
Does cultural evolution promote, or
suppress, natural selection?
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesbut convincing empirical demonstrations have been elusive. We have argued that there is now
compelling evidence of the Baldwinisation of cognition from Drosophila, and that research in
cognitive science indicates that peripheral rather than central cognitive mechanisms have been
the primary targets of selection.
Why might selection operate primarily at the cognitive periphery? A parallel with the evolution of
other biological mechanisms is suggestive: internal physiological processes and anatomical
structures are remarkably well-conserved. The organisation of the digestive, circulatory, and
respiratory systems is similar across vertebrate species, and they are so deeply interconnected
that modifications beyond changes of size and shape may be difficult without causing substantial
collateral damage. Moreover, even such modest changes to central systems will impact on a
wide variety of functions and may therefore not be under strong selection from any one function.
By contrast, interfaces with the external environment (jaws, teeth, digestive enzymes, bone and
muscle structure) can be adapted to local circumstances (e.g., food sources) without interfering
with central systems. The central machinery of cognition is less well understood, but may be
equally interlocking, with widespread functional ramification, and a consequent resistance to
evolutionary change.
Alternatively, it is possible that central cognitive processes are fully evolvable, but, at least in the
human case, tend to be adaptively specialised by cultural rather than by genetic selection
[101]. In domains such as language, imitation, mathematics, and ethics, changes to central
mechanisms can be acquired through cultural learning. Cognitive skills that are taught, and
those that are learned from others through more informal social interaction, do not need to sink
in. Baldwinisation would bring little if any fitness advantage for skills that are reliably inherited via
a non-genetic route [17], and specialised central mechanisms may be more teachable than
specialised peripheral mechanisms. Plausibly, it is easier to learn grammatical constructions
than vocal control through conversation, and, in the case of imitation, easier to learn sensorimotor
mappings than intrinsic motivation through non-vocal social interaction.
These possibilities warrant further investigation, but the main purpose of this article is to draw
attention to empirical work and to encourage testing for Baldwin effects in cognitive science (see
Outstanding Questions). Many nonspecialists assume that research on taste aversion, fear learn-
ing, language, and imitation has produced solid evidence of genetically specialised learning mech-
anisms. This view is outdated. Careful empirical work, starting in the 1970s, has shown that
efficiency in these domains depends on genetically specialised input and output processes, and
that these cognitive equivalents of scanners and printers are likely to be Baldwin effects.
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